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Abstract
This paper focuses on the fundamental determinants of the degree of financial integration in the European
Union over the period 1973-1993. Using closed interest differentials to measure the intensity of capital
controls and applying a panel data approach, we find realized inflation rates, government deficits, current
account deficits and credits to the domestic economy to be significantly positively correlated with the intensity
of capital export restrictions. In addition, low productivity in the business sector and low availability of
sophisticated deposit instruments are positively related to the intensity of capital export controls. Consequently,
remaining differences in national economic and financial structures, should be of greater interest to
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the fundamental determinants of degree of financial integration -- or more precisely
of the intensity of capital controls -- in the European Union (EU) over the period 1973-1993.
1 Macroeconomic
evidence seems to support the view that the integration between European financial markets has increased
in recent years (see Lemmen and Eijffinger, 1993, Frankel, Phillips and Chinn, 1993 and Lemmen and
Eijffinger, 1995a). It fosters the impression that remaining differences in national economic and financial
structures are unimportant. Moreover, it may tend to overstate the pressure towards, and hence the speed
of integration. An obvious question, then, is what are the main determinants of financial integration. A
thorough understanding of the determinants of the intensity of capital controls may provide important insight
into the process of financial and monetary integration in Europe and may help in policy formulation.
This paper improves analysis started by Epstein and Schor (1992) and Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti
(1994) in a number of aspects. First, previous investigations of the determinants of capital controls (Epstein
and Schor, 1992, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1994, Gruijters, 1994, Milesi-Ferretti, 1995 and Grilli
and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995) typically constructed dummy variables or capital control indices to measure the
degreeoffinancialintegration.Aswewillargue,thesemeasuresareproblematicbecausetheydonotaccount
for different intensities of capital controls. In our opinion, this aspects is of crucial importance for policy
analysis. We compute deviations from closed interest parity to measure the intensity of capital controls.
Resultingnegative(positive)deviationsfromclosedinterestparityareassociatedwithcapitalexport(import)
restrictions. Second, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) apply their analysis to the financial markets
of 20 OECD countries. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) apply their analysis to 61 developed and less-
developed countries. In practice, integration attempts across the world are more of a geographical nature.
The EU financial markets can be seen as an excellent sample to test for the fundamental determinants of
financial integration because they are in the process of institutional integration. Most legal barriers have
been either removed or are scheduled to be removed. Furthermore, the EU has adopted a stronger form
of harmonization for its financial services -- a policy of mutual recognition whereby member states within
the EU have agreed to allow financial intermediaries from other states to operate under home country rules
and supervision. Third, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) apply Maximum Likelihood Estimation
to estimate various logit/probit models. We innovatively apply a panel data approach to estimate various
fixed-effects models. The panel data approach allows us to include those author’s political variables (the
country-specific effects) along with other explanatory variables. Furthermore, several new explanatory
variables were included in our analysis: the realized depreciation of the exchange rate, the unemployment
rate, the productivity in the business sector, the ratios of government deficit, domestic credit and broad
money over gross domestic product and the ratio of broad money over narrow money. Contrary to Alesina,
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) and related papers who emphasize the importance of various political
variables, we argue that various measures of national economic and financial structure have considerable
explanatory power in the determination of capital controls. We find high realized inflation rates, high
government deficits, high current account deficits, high credit expansion to the economy, low productivity
in the business sector and low availability of sophisticated deposit instruments to be the main determinants
of the intensity capital export restrictions. According to the evidence, remaining differences in national
economic and financial structures, should be of greater interest to policymakers.
2
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a meaningful measure of the degree of financial
integration,whichisthedependentvariableinourempiricalanalysis.Thispaperfocusesonthe priceaspect
of financial integration. That is, financial integration is expected to lead to price convergence. As we will
argue, the price measure -- i.e. the closed interest rate differential -- is particularly suited to measure the
1 The concepts of "financial integration" and "intensity of capital controls" are used interchangeable.
2 Our argument is also demonstrated by the events during the exchange crises in the European Monetary System.2
intensity of capital controls (lack of offshore interest rates in a number of countries forces us to construct
a synthetic approximation of closed interest differentials using forward exchange rates). Because capital
controls are plausible sources introducing persistence in return differentials, section 2 therefore also formulates
a partial adjustment model of the price measure of financial integration. Section 3 identifies the main
determinants of capital controls. For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we link these determinants to
several relevant analytical indicators. Section 4 analyses the effect of these indicators on the intensity of
capital controls usinga panel data approach. We estimatea fixed-effects model, principally attributing country
risk to an country-specific effect which of course differs among countries. The analysis is carried out for
11 EU countries over the period 1973-1993 for which relevant annual data are available. The frequency
of the data was dictated by the absence of higher frequency data on important macroeconomic determinants
of financial integration and by the fact that we want to evaluate long-term trends in financial integration.
Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Alternative measures of the degree of financial integration
This section addresses the definition and measurement of the dependent variable: the degree of financial
integration.First,wearguethatthepricemeasureistobepreferredtoconcentratingonthe volumeofcapital
flows themselves. As markets become more integrated, asset prices often adjust in anticipation of capital
flows that would otherwise occur. Consequently, the volume of capital flows is less suited to measure the
degree of financial integration.
3 In addition, the price measure is also to be preferred to more legal oriented
approaches of capital controls that construct dummy variables or indices of capital controls intensity. Since
financial integration is essentially a legal concept, previous research on the determinants of the degree of
financial integration (Epstein and Schor, 1992, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1994, Gruijters, 1994,
Milesi-Ferretti, 1995 and Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995) typically constructed dummy variables or capital
control indices to measure the degree of financial integration. Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994)
use dummy variables -- taking the value 1 when capital controls are in place and 0 otherwise -- to measure
capital controls. Unfortunately, dummy variables cannot explain different degrees of intensity of capital
controls over time (Epstein and Schor, 1992, p. 143). Epstein and Schor (1992) construct an annual capital
control index compiled from the summary table at the end of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) ’s
Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. This index is composed of restrictions
on payments for capital transactions (i.e. capital controls) and the use of separate exchange rate(s) for some
or all capital transactions and/or some or all invisibles(i.e. dual exchange markets). Both types of restrictions
are given equal weight. If both restrictions are in place, the index takes the value of 2, if one restriction
is in place the index takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. Appendix A at the end of the paper gives an
idea of what this means for our EU countries. As follows from Appendix A, capital control indices are
more capable of explaining different degrees of intensity of capital controls than dummy variables. Epstein
and Schor (1992, p. 141), however, argue that the IMF definitions do no include some indirect measures
against capital flows which might reasonably be considered capital controls (e.g. the interest equalisation
tax). Furthermore, the IMF does not distinguish between restrictions to limit capital outflows and restrictions
to limit capital inflows (i.e. the direction of capital flows), and between restrictions on short-term and
restrictions on long-term capital flows (i.e. the maturity of capital flows). Gruijters (1994, pp. 198-213)
tries to overcome these weaknesses and constructs two capital control indices to explain the intensity of
capital import restrictions and the intensity of capital export restrictions, respectively. The indices are based
uponahistoricalsurveyofdirectandindirectcapitalcontrolsin11OECDcountries.Themeasureimplicitly
embodies numerous types of restrictions, with some being more important than others across different
countries. However, the major shortcoming endemic to all legal measures is the subjective element needed
to construct them. Ample historical evidence suggests that there have been significant discrepancies between
3 Besides, long time-series data of gross capital flows are not available (see Kouri and Porter, 1974).3
the legal and actual intensity of controls. Restrictions are not always binding (i.e. effective) or some indirect
restrictions are simply not taken into account. As a result it may be a mistake to conclude that the market
is segmented. The private sector is extremely creative in finding ways to move capital internationally. In
countries with restrictions on capital mobility, the private sector has typically resorted to leads and lags
in average payments terms for exports and imports to evade legal controls on capital flows.
4 Moreover,
theEurocurrencymarkethasplayedanimportantroleinevadingcapitalcontrols.So,oneneedstogobeyond
legal restrictions in assessing the extent of capital mobility.
The measure we use takes account of short-term financial integration because forward exchange rates exist
only for short horizons generally not exceeding one year.
5 In the investigation design, the underlying financial
assets differ only with respect to currency of denomination and country-specific regulation (e.g. capital
controls and tax treatment), rather than with respect to asset-specific types of risk (e.g. default risk and
liquidity risk) or other risk characteristics.
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Wearguethatclosednominalinterestratedifferentialsaremostsuitedtocapturedifferencesintheintensity
of capital controls. This follows from the decomposition of onshore covered nominal interest rate parity
in Table 1. This may be demonstrated by distinguishing between covered nominal interest parity in onshore
markets (for comparable assets in different political jurisdictions and restrictions on cross-border capital
flows) and covered nominal interest parity in offshore markets (for comparable assets in the same political
jurisdiction and no restrictions on cross-border capital flows). Each of the components fDomestic, fForeign and
fEuro provides information on the source of the onshore covered nominal interest rate differential. fDomestic
measurestheextenttowhichdomesticcontrolsarethecauseofanon-zeroonshorecoverednominalinterest
rate differential. Similarly, fForeign measures the extent to which foreign controls contribute to a non-zero
onshore covered nominal interest rate differential. fEuro measures deviations from covered interest arbitrage
in offshore markets. We assume that interest arbitrage ensures that differences from covered interest rate
parity in offshore markets (fEuro) are negligible. Since banks in Euromarkets set Euro-interest rates of the
domestic country (say the Euro-Sterling rate) equal to foreign Euro-interest rates (say the Euro-Deutsche
Markrate)adjustedfortheforwardpremium(discount)onthedomesticcurrency,offshorecoverednominal
interest parity will always hold in Euromarkets. Deviations in the Euromarket are largely due to technical
factors and/or transactions costs. Under this assumption, the domestic onshore-offshore interest rate differential
may be approximated by the adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differential (see Giavazzi and
Giovannini, 1989, p. 172).
4 Therefore, Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) use a current account restrictions dummy variable to proxy
for the intensity of capital controls.
5Although currencyswapsallowus tocalculatedeviationsfrom coveredinterestrateparity forlongerhorizons,they arenotavailable
over a sufficiently long time horizon (see Popper, 1993).
6Preferably, one might also want to disentangle the effect of interest rate withholding taxation. Interest withholding taxes importantly
affect the pre-tax gross return demanded by international investors. Huizinga (1994) adjusts the interest rate parity condition for
the effect of nonresident interest withholding taxation. Since the effects of interest rate withholding taxation are difficult to grasp,
we leave this aspect for further research.4
Table 1 − The decomposition of the onshore covered nominal interest rate differential
(1) Offshore covered nominal interest rate differential
(2) Domestic onshore-offshore closed nominal interest rate differential
(3) Foreign offshore-onshore closed nominal interest rate differential
(4)=(1)+(2)+(3) Onshore covered nominal interest rate differential
Now, we may derive our measure for the intensity of capital controls. The domestic intensity of capital controls may be
approximated by the adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differential
while the foreign intensity of capital controls may be approximated by the adjusted foreign covered nominal interest rate differential
where banks ensure that offshore covered nominal interest rate parity holds continuously. That is, we may write
and
Symbols:
= domestic onshore nominal rate of interest at time t on a k-period bond held between time t and t+k
= domestic offshore nominal rate of interest at time t on a k-period bond held between time t and t+k
= forward exchange rate at time t for the delivery of foreign currency at time t+k
= spot exchange rate at time t (defined as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency)
= holding period of the underlying debt instrument
= denotes a foreign variable
Source: Goldsbrough and Teja (1991) and authors’ own summary of the literature.
Consequently, the domestic intensity of capital controls may either be measured by the domestic onshore-
offshore closed nominal interest rate differential
or by the adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differential
(1)
Capital controls will be an important reason for significant deviations from onshore covered nominal interest
(2)
parity.
7 Since offshore covered nominal interest rate parity is zero by assumption, it follows that any
differential between the Euro-rate and the domestic rate on a comparable asset is likely to reflect domestic
capital controls. Closed and adjusted covered nominal interest rate differentials have been widely used to
7 More precisely, capital controls that are economically significant -- thus lying outside a small band of differentials created by
transaction costs.5
measuretheintensityc.q.effectivenessofcapitalcontrols.Theclosedandadjustedcoverednominalinterest
differentials -- we will refer to as country risk premia -- primarily reflect the joint influence of existing
and expected capital controls (i.e. political risks) (Aliber 1973, p. 1453). They indicate agents’ ability to
move financial assets across national borders.
Capital controls play two major roles. First, where capital controls are effective, they produce a bias against
either capital inflows or capital outflows.
8 In general, a negative domestic onshore-offshore interest differential
or a negative adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differential is indicative of capital export
restrictions in the domestic country (c.q. capital import restrictions in the foreign country). Second, they
tend to slow down the process of convergence of closed c.q. adjusted covered nominal interest differentials.
Therefore, we formulate a partial adjustment model for the closed c.q. adjusted covered nominal interest
ratedifferential. The partialadjustment modelfor the closednominal interest rate differentialmay be derived
as follows (suppressing the time and country subscripts) (see Harvey, 1990, p. 230-231):
Equation (3) shows that theactual interest rate differential in period t equals the actual interest rate differential
(3)
in the previous period t-1 and the proportion (y) in which the difference between the desired interest rate
differential in period t (bar) and the actual interest rate differential in the previous period t-1 (no bar) is
erased. Finally, e denotes an error term. Rewriting equation (3) leads to equation (4):
Assuming the desired domestic interest rate differential is determined by a constant (d1) and other determinants
(4)
(x)
9
(5)
and combining (4) and (5) leads to
Similarly, the partial adjustment model for the adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differential
(6)
may be formulated as follows:
Annual series for closed nominal interest rate parity may be derived as follows (see Appendix B):
(7)
for Germany, France, Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
10 Unfortunately, Euro-interest rates are not
(8)
available for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Spain and Sweden. Therefore, for these countries
8 This reasoning applies to both direct or quantitative measures (consisting of outright restrictions or prohibitions of certain capital
transactions) and indirect or cost measures (effecting the operations of the banking and nonbanking sector). Numerous qualitative
studies exist that describe the introduction and workings of capital control measures.
9 In section 3, we identify relevant determinants.
10 Data for Germany refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before the unification of Germany.6
we calculate annual series of adjusted covered nominal interest rate differentials (see Appendix B):
which is equivalent to the closed nominal interest rate differential under the assumption of covered interest
(9)
rate parity in offshore markets. Henceforth, when we speak about closed interest differentials we also mean
adjusted covered interest rate differentials.
Appendix C plots the year-by-year average deviations from the price measure over the period 1973-1993.
Unfortunately, we had to take a shorter sample period for Italy (1977-1993) due to the lack of forward
exchange rate data. Clearly, Appendix C shows a declining pattern of closed interest differentials, with
alternating periodsof relatively high and lowcapital control intensity. Finally,note that caremust be exercised
in taking the closed interest rate differentials as an indication of the intensity of capital controls, since
differences in asset-specific types of risk cannot be completely excluded.
11 The next section identifies
the main determinants of capital controls. Why do governments regulate financial markets?
3 The rationales for capital controls
This section focuses on the rationales for capital controls. Several authors have dealt with the issue of the
rationales for capital controls (see e.g. Cairncross, 1973, OECD, 1980, OECD, 1990a, Mathieson and Rojas-
Suarez, 1993, 1994 and the sections on capital flows of IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and Exchange Restrictions). We take an eclectic approach to identify the main determinants of financial
integration in the EU. Thus, we investigate whether certain economic, institutional and political features
of individual countries may explain the intensity of capital controls.
12 In addition, we offer some analytical
indicatorsfor thedeterminants ofcapitalcontrols. Somedeterminants ofcapitalcontrols mayactually apply
more to long-term capital flows. So, in the empirical analysis we should find them to be less significant.
According to Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1994) the main three arguments for capital controls in industrial
countries are: (1) Limiting volatile short-term capital flows, (2) Retaining domestic savings and (3)
Maintaining the domestic tax structure (tax rates and tax base). Cairncross (1973) comes up with a fourth
rationale for capital controls: (4) Applying the "second-best" principle of welfare economics.
(1) Limiting volatile short-term capital flows
(1a) Capital controls support the sustainability of fixed but adjustable c.q. unilateral pegged exchange rates:
i.e. capital controls limit the scope for speculative attacks
13
The recent turbulence in the European Monetary System (EMS) of pegged but adjustable exchange rates
andofcountriesunilateralpeggingtheirexchangeratestotheECUorDM(SwedenandFinland),highlights
the importance of the choice of the exchange rate arrangement. An important feature of the functioning
of the EMS was the maintenance of many capital controls to support monetary policy. Controls took a
variety of forms, ranging from taxes on holdings of foreign-currency assets to restrictions on the ability
11 The price measure may be more informative about country-specific regulation using treasury bill rates with the same default
risks. Unfortunately, treasury bill rates are unavailable for all EU countries considered, or the depth of the treasury bill market
is low (see Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984, p. 132 and Appendix B).
12 The rationales for capital controls are often intimately related. So, they may be encompassed under more headings.
13 This subdivision partially follows Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994).7
of banks to lend abroad (see Giavazzi and Giovannini, 1989). Capital controls should (temporarily) prevent
c.q. discourage speculative capital flows (see Wyplosz, 1988, p. 95). For example, when the markets expect
a realignment, the holding of weak currencies becomes more risky (i.e. the degree of substitutability between
weak and strong currencies diminishes). If the authorities of weak currency countries wish to avoid or delay
the realignment they will be obliged to raise domestic interest rates to make investors indifferent to the
choice between holding domestic and foreign assets. This interest rate variability is particularly damaging
in countries where the government has a large proportion of short-term debt, or when longer-term debt
instrumentsareindexedtoshort-terminterestrates,asisthecaseinItaly(Alesina,GrilliandMilesi-Ferretti,
1994, p. 294). Similarly, currency pegging with concomitant high short-term domestic interest rates also
harm households and firms with large proportions of short-term debt. On the other hand, restrictions on
capitalexportmay(temporarily)sustainthepressureforthedomesticinterestratetorise.Foreignersengaged
in speculative transactions move to the offshore markets causing large offshore-onshore interest rate
differentials. For example, during the EMS exchange crisis of September 1992 Ireland, Portugal and Spain
defended their exchange rate by creating large offshore-onshore interest rate differentials through the
reintroduction of measures penalizing speculative transactions by non-residents.
We hypothesise that countries participating in less flexible exchange rate arrangements are more inclined
to use capital import and export controls. To that end, we construct an index variable (EXR) of exchange
rate flexibility taking the value of 2 during periods of minimal flexibility (i.e. the exchange rate flexibility
is limited in terms of a cooperative arrangement under mutual intervention arrangements (the "snake" or
EMS), 1 during period of intermediate flexibility (i.e. the exchange rate is maintained within relatively
narrow margins in terms of a single currency (DM or US dollar) or a composite of currencies (ECU)) and
the value of 0 during periods of maximum flexibility (i.e. more flexible arrangements) (see Appendix B
for data sources). Our index variable EXR differs from the dummy variable EXR constructed by Alesina,
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) where periods of minimal and intermediate flexibility take the value 1
and periods with maximum flexibility take the value 0. Figure 1 plots the classification of the exchange
rate arrangement (EXR) against the average deviation of the price measure representing the intensity of
capital controls (CC) over the period 1973-1993. In addition, we report a bivariate cross-section regression
with variables averaged over the period 1973-1993 to investigate the relationship between exchange rate
flexibility and the intensity of capital controls. One asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly
different from zero at the 95 % confidence interval, while two asterisks indicate that the coefficient is
significantly different from zero at the 99 % confidence interval. Standard errors are indicated between
parentheses. Furthermore, we report the adjusted coefficient of determination (R
2).
Figure 1 - The intensity of capital controls: The classification of the exchange rate arrangement
CC = − 1.67 + 0.05 EXR R
2 = 0.01
(0.91) (0.05)8
(1b) Capital controls preserve monetary autonomy
Monetaryautonomyreferstotheextenttowhichthecentralbankisinapositiontocontroldomesticinterest
rates, that is, to conduct monetary policy independently of the rest of the world.
14 The degree of monetary
autonomy is determined by three factors: (1) exchange rate variability, (2) the substitutability of domestic
and foreign assets and (3) the effectiveness of capital controls. The substitutability of domestic and foreign
assets is partly dependent on exchange rate uncertainty, and the first factor can, therefore, be seen as an
important aspect of the second. Capital controls that entirely preclude interest-sensitive capital movements
result in complete autonomy -- irrespective of the exchange rate regime. Effective capital controls impose
further restrictions on the substitutability of domestic and foreign assets. Capital controls or the threat of
capital controls may result in significant country premia as described by Aliber (1973). This country premium
is exploitable to achieve monetary independence. With no restrictions on capital movements, on the other
hand,thesubstitutabilityofdomesticandforeignassetsneedstobeimperfect,forsomemonetaryautonomy
to exist. The OECD (1990a, p. 25) argues: "In integrated financial markets monetary policy cannot control
interest rates and exchange rates simultaneously, without the use of another instrument -- capital controls,
for example.
15 The imposition of capital controls allows the government to pursue "inconsistent" monetary
policies for a while.
16 The OECD (1990a, p. 23) argues: "Thus, exchange controls have been often viewed
as a means whereby the authorities may seek to insulate, at least temporarily, domestic credit expansion
from monetary developments abroad and increase the autonomy with which the supply of money can be
steered to influence domestic objectives. With fixed exchange rates, the freedom of capital movements
opens greater possibilities for low-risk interest arbitrage when interest rates differ across countries. In the
limiting case -- with perfect capital mobility -- movements of capital should theoretically induce interest
rates to be maintained at complete parity across countries. This means that, for example, a reduction of
domestic interest rates resulting from an expansionary monetary policy stance would induce capital to flow
out of the country, thereby offsetting the monetary expansion and provoking a rise in domestic interest
rates back to the parity level. Indeed, any significant deviation of domestic interest rates from parity levels
across countries would result in capital flows leading eventually to restoration of interest rate parity."
The incentive of the government to impose capital controls should, then, depend on the degree of control
the government has over monetary policy. The control the government acquires over monetary policy by
imposing capital controls depends (among other things) on the degree of independence of the central bank.
We hypothesise this control to be tighter, the less independent the central bank (see also Alesina, Grilli
andMilesi-Ferretti,1994andMilesi-Ferretti,1995).WeemploytheEijffinger-Schalingindex(ES)ofcentral
bank independence, since it is available for all EU countries considered (see Appendix B).
17 For the
Eijffinger-Schaling index, the following rule applies: the higher the score ranging from 1 to 5, the more
independent the central bank. Figure 2 plots the Eijffinger-Schaling index of central bank independence
against the intensity of capital controls. Clearly, countries with less independent central banks maintain
capital export restrictions, while countries with highly independent central banks maintain capital import
restrictions. It may be argued that the Eijffinger-Schaling index of central bank independence points at long
run monetary policy independence, which means that countries may opt for different rates of steady-state
inflation. Consequently, high levels of inflation (INF) may also indicate the increased presence of capital
export controls. The plot for the relationship between INF and CC is contained in Appendix D. Only plots
14 Policymakers attempt to insulate the economy from external disturbances.
15 See also the discussion in articles of Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz (1995, pp. 162-172), Garber and Taylor (1995, pp. 173-180)
and Kenen (1995, pp. 181-192) of the January 1995 Economic Journal Policy Forum on Sand in the Wheels of International Finance.
Other policy instruments are the imposition of a transaction tax (Tobin Tax) on purchases and sales of foreign currency or a non-
interest-bearing deposit requirement on loans in domestic currency to non-residents.
16 The argument for capital controls to pursue "inconsistent" fiscal policies follows later.
17 Cukierman’s legal index (LVAU) of central bank independence which is also available for all EU countries in our sample gives
similar results. The Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) total (economic and political) index of central bank independence
also gives similar results. However, this index is not available for all EU countries. The same holds for the Alesina (1988, 1989)
and the Bade-Parkin (1988) legal indices of central bank independence.9
which represent the institutional and political variables are contained in the main text.
Figure 2 - The intensity of capital controls: The Eijffinger-Schaling index of central bank independence
CC = − 2.63
** + 0.66
** ES R
2 = 0.55
(0.55) (0.18)
Capital controls may also follow from the need to prevent the loss of foreign exchange reserves of the central
bank in case of a speculative attack or inconsistent monetary policies. The OECD (1990a, p. 27) argues:
"Countries pursuing exchange rate targets may feel concern with the adequacy of their currency reserves
in relation to real or potential flows of capital at the given exchange rate." In the EMS -- characterized
by periodic realignments -- anticipation of a realignment may give rise to speculative attacks against the
reserves of the central banks. The central bank may try to offset the impact of undesirable capital movements
on domestic monetary aggregates through sterilisation. In addition, a country that expands its rate of money
growth to reduce its interest rate, capital controls will prevent the outflow of capital seeking yields abroad.
Consequently, a useful indicator of the inconsistencies in monetary policy is the ratio of broad money over
GDP(M2). Withamonetary expansion,capital exportrestrictionsare needed,while amonetary contraction
dictates capital import restrictions. The variable M2 was not included in previous research of Alesina, Grilli
and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) and related papers.
(1c) Capital controls limit exchange rate volatility under flexible exchange rates
Although flexible exchange rates free the national monetary authorities from balance of payments
constraints
18 and thus from the need to impose capital controls, capital controls still are frequently defended
as a stabilization policy instrument under flexible exchange rates. The case for limiting capital mobility
under flexible exchange rates relies on the differential speed of adjustment between the financial and the
real sector (Dornbusch, 1976). This differential speed of adjustment, together with "excess volatility" in
financial markets, may induce excess exchange rate volatility with negative effects on trade (Bini-Smaghi,
1991, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1994, p. 294). The argument is closely related to the previous
argument, since it may also hold during periods with exchange rate realignments, and for exchange rate
movements within a band. Controls on capital inflows are intended to keep a strong currency from becoming
stronger. Controls on capital outflows are intended to support a weak currency. We expect exchange rate
depreciation(appreciation)tobeamajordrivingforceforcapitaloutflows(inflows).Therefore,weconstruct
aproxyfortheexpectedexchangeratedepreciation(DEP).Weapplytheassumptionofrationalexpectations
to proxy exchange rate expectations by their realized values. The proxy for Germany is based on the bilateral
exchangerateexpressedinDMperUS$,fortheotherEuropeancountriestheproxyisexpressedinnational
18 Exchange rate depreciation is regularly defended to restore the loss of competitiveness (see also argument 2b).10
currency per DM.
19 The variable DEP was not included in previous research.
(2) Retaining domestic savings
(2a) Capital controls limit differences between private and social returns
Anotherargumentforcapitalcontrolsisderivedfrompossibledifferencesbetweenprivateandsocialreturns.
This argument has been used particularly in relation to direct foreign investment.
20 The OECD (1990a,
p. 26) assert: "Whereas a private investor will invest abroad if the after-tax return from foreign assets is
higher than the domestic return, the social return to the home country of the investment may be less than
that of a domestic investment since the employment, production and tax-revenue benefits accrue to the
host country." Capital controls can be used to retain domestic savings at home by reducing the return on
foreign assets (e.g. through the introduction of an interest equalisation tax) and by limiting access to foreign
assets. Thus, capital controls may raise investment in the domestic economy and, hence, economic growth.
Furthermore, capital controls can be used to influence the distribution of ownership of domestic and foreign
productive assets. With capital export restrictions a larger fraction of domestic assets will be owned by
domestic residents and a smaller fraction of foreign assets will be owned by domestic residents.
21 A relevant
indicator for the private return is the productivity in the business sector (PROD). The variable was not
included in previous research. The productivity in the business sector reflects the attractiveness of domestic
financial markets as the potential location of foreign capital. Countries with relatively high productivity
in the business sector are expected to have restrictions on capital import. The unemployment rate (UN)
may be a relevant indicator of social costs. With relatively high unemployment rates more capital export
restrictions are expected to be in place. Again, this variable was not included in previous research.
(2b) Capital controls to maintain internal and external balance
With respect to this argument, the OECD (1990a, p. 27) remarks: "With substantial problems with both
internal and external imbalances, policy concerns may increasingly be expressed in relation to the financing
of government debt accumulation and balance of payments deficits and the size and the composition of
external debt." Capital controls might keep interest rates down so as to reduce the cost of servicing its debt
(Wyplosz, 1988, p. 88). Thus, capital controls may help to smooth and/or delay necessary internal adjustments
to outside pressures. We conjecture that the ratio of general government financial balance to GDP (also
referred to as net lending of the government) (DEF) may be a relevant indicator for the intensity of capital
controls. Governments with large budget deficits relative to GDP are expected to impose more capital export
restrictions to preserve the tax base. This variable was also not included in previous research. Similarly,
governments with large proportions of gross debt relative to GDP (DEBT) are expected to impose capital
export controls.
Others countries have implemented capital controls measures to facilitate the financing of current account
deficits and to influence the structure of such financing. The OECD (1990a, p. 27) argues: "It may also
be felt that exchange controls can support the management of future current account flows resulting from
interest and debt payments. In this connection, restrictive regulations may be advocated with a view to
influencing the sectoral composition and term-structure of foreign debt." The subsequent empirical analysis
will introduce the ratio of current account balance to GDP (CA) as a relevant indicator. We expect countries
with large current account deficits to impose capital export restrictions and countries with large current
account surpluses to impose capital import restrictions. Note however, that countries generally show
asymmetric behaviour with respect to targeting the current account: capital export restrictions with current
19 Evidently, the proxy for Germany is less comparable with the proxy for the other EU countries. Of course, an alternative proxy
expressedinECUalsohasitsdrawbacks.ItwillbedominatedbyGermanyanditmaybedifficulttoconstructduetodataavailability.
20 Note that this argument is more related to long-term capital movements.
21 Capital controls may be designed to limit foreign ownership of certain sectors of the economy.11
account deficits, no capital import restrictions with current account surpluses.
(3) Maintaining the domestic tax structure (tax base and tax rates)
3(a) Capital controls prevent tax arbitrage
Taxation affects the pattern of international capital flows -- by directing savings and financial transactions
to countries with a favourable fiscal regime. Differences in the taxation of the returns on capital (withholding
taxes on interests, profits and dividends) across countries may lead to capital flight from high to low tax
countries to such an extent that nations may be deprived of their tax bases and, as a consequence, of their
welfare systems. Differences in the tax structure are created by different tax rates, differences in the bases
that are taxed and by different possibilities of avoidance and evasion. The importance of differences in
taxstructureinexplainingclosednominalinterestratedifferentialsislikelytoincreasewithmoreintegrated
financial markets.
In addition, countries with inefficient tax systems may be more likely to impose capital controls. Because
they erode the tax base, capital outflows may greatly reduce the efficacy of the inflation tax on domestic
money holdings. The use of inflation tax is more attractive in the presence of a large tax base, i.e. when
the demand for base money is high. This is more likely in countries where a large amount of transactions
take place with the use of cash, and where banks have large amounts of reserves (Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti, 1994, p. 304). Capital controls, by isolating domestic financial intermediaries from foreign
competition, allow the imposition of high bank reserve requirements. This maintains a high demand for
monetary base and thus assures a large tax base for the inflation tax. The inflation tax provides the government
an alternative source of revenue as opposed to conventional forms of distorting taxation such as income
taxation (Phelps, 1973, Cukierman, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992)).
22
Of course, this argument is closely related to the previous argument on the maintenance of internal balance.
Relevant indicators are the inflation tax (INF TAX, the inflation rate times base money as percentage of
GDP, activeinstrument i.e.the growthof seigniorageas aconsequence ofinflation) and seigniorage(SEIGN,
the growth rate of nominal GDP times base money as percentage of GDP, active and passive instrument
i.e.thegrowthofseigniorageasaconsequenceofinflationandrealincome).Weconjecturethatwithhigher
inflation tax and seigniorage revenue, the intensity of capital export controls will be higher.
(3b) Capital controls redistribute income
Left-wing governments are hypothesized to favour the taxation of capital income over that of labour income,
and to be tempted to introduce capital controls to prevent capital export and thus maintain a large domestic
tax base for capital levies (Alesina, Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1994).
23 We introduce the dummy variable
LEFT, taking the value 1 when a left-wing government is in place and the value 0 otherwise (see Appendix
B). Furthermore, we expect political unstable countries to have more capital export restrictions. We proxy
the political instability of countries with the frequency of significant government changes (SIGGOV)
constructed by De Haan and Van ’tHag (1994).
24 This brings us to the final argument for capital controls.
22 Note, however, the inflation tax may not be a choice variable for the government if monetary policy conduct is delegated to
an independent central bank.
23 Underlying the capital levy explanation of capital controls is the assumption that the government has sufficiently wide support
to introduce capital controls.
24 The Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) index of significant government changes gives similar results. However, this index
is not available for Finland and Sweden.12
Figure 3 - The intensity of capital controls: The total number of left-wing governments and the total
number of significant government changes
CC = − 0.72 − 0.004 LEFT R
2 = −0.11 CC = − 0.25 − 0.21 SIGGOV R
2 = 0.04
(1.00) (0.08) (0.53) (0.18)
(4) Applying the "second-best" principle of welfare economics
(4a) Capital controls correct distortions in labour and goods markets
Capital controls have also been defended with reference to the "second-best" principle of welfare economics.
Second-best theory suggests that government intervention can enhance welfare in the presence of multiple
distortions. If some unavoidable rigidities exist in goods and labour markets, it has been argued, then some
"optimal" degree of distortions in the operation of financial markets might lead to an overall improvement
of welfare.
25 Unavoidable rigidities in goods and labour markets are best matched by some institutionally
created rigidities in foreign exchange and financial markets (Cairncross, 1973). Capital flows exacerbate
economic distortions in the short run and long run. Relevant indicators of economic structure are the
productivity in the business sector (PROD) and the openness of the economy (OPEN). With high openness
capital controls are less effective, so they are less likely imposed. On the other hand, one may argue, with
high openness capital controls may shield the economy from foreign competition, so they are more likely
imposed. Moreover, the productivity in the business sector and the openness of the economy may also control
for omitted variables in the regression specification -- i.e. variables which are strongly correlated with these
control variables.
(4b) Capital controls correct distortions in financial markets and financial systems
We hold that the explanation of European differences in the degree of financial integration cannot abstract
from the analysis of country-specific differences in financial market structure (the financial system inclusive).
The structure and regulation of the domestic financial system is at the heart of the use of capital controls.
With financial markets becoming increasinglyintegrated, the role of country-specific differences in financial
market structure in explaining closed interest differentials is likely to increase. The OECD (1990a, p. 27)
argues: "The authorities may also wish to regulate capital flows because of concerns with the degree of
foreign exchange exposure of domestic financial institutions and its implications for the soundness of the
financial system as a whole.
26 One set of reasons advanced for limiting the size and mobility of capital
flows relates to the associated foreign exchange risks as well as the potential for undermining national
prudential standards by allowing domestic investors to acquire assets that the authorities consider unsound
or by encouraging the emergence of instruments and practices the authorities do not wish to see developed
inlocalmarkets."Thefinancialmarketstructureof EUcountriescanbeseenastheoutcomeofthe behaviour
of the various sectors in the economy (Lemmen and Eijffinger, 1995b). According to Hubbard (1994, p.
25 Or, to keep trade free of tariffs and subsidies, it may be necessary to regulate capital movements.
26 The rationale for capital controls and regulation of domestic financial markets results from the desire to avoid systemic risk.13
246), financial market structure refers to "[...] the mix of finance between equity and debt and to the source
of funds -- through financial markets or through financial intermediaries." The term "financial structure"
may be defined fairly broadly to include such features as the degree of development of money and financial
markets; the degree of competition within the banking system, and between banks and other intermediaries,
the existence of constraints on capital movements; the ownership structure of the financial intermediaries
(Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994, p. 590). Among the facts that interfere with the relationships between financial
integration andfinancial marketstructure are thepersistent differencein bank-based andmarket-based systems,
the uneven development and structure of financial balances and the unequal responsiveness of interest rates
to monetary policy (Bankfor International Settlements, 1994, pp.136-140). In many ofthe national financial
markets bank deposit and loan rates were subject to regulation and other distortions (see Marston, 1995,
Chapter 2). Policies that seek to maintain nonmarket interest rates on loans or deposits are undermined
byinternationalarbitrageunlessbackedupbycontrols.Taxesonfinancialintermediationcancausefinancial
activity to move offshore unless backed up by controls.
Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to find relevant indicators of financial market structure. Due to data
availability we had to employ rather crude measures of financial market structure.
27 We conjecture that
the intensity of capital controls is negatively related to the development of the financial system. We
hypothesise that less-developed financial markets are characterized by relatively low intermediation by
financial institutions to the domestic economy (CREDIT); that is, domestic credit expansion is relatively
low, and relatively low ratios of broad money (M2) over narrow money (M1) (M2M1); that is, the
development ofmore sophisticated deposit instruments is relatively low.
28 Both variableds were not included
in previous research. On the other hand, CREDIT may also indicate inconsistent monetary policies and
the presence of capital export restrictions. So, we will let the data decide which of the two arguments holds.
4 The fundamental determinants of financial integration in the European Union: Empirical results
and interpretation
ThissectiondeterminesempiricallythefundamentaldeterminantsoffinancialintegrationintheEU.Because
we would like to infer conclusions about a country-specific effect which cannot be observed directly, we
resort to the use of panel data. With the use of panel data the partial adjustment model specified in equation
(6) of section 2 takes the following form:
29
(10)
where b0=yd1 is the common intercept term, b1=(1-y) is the partial adjustment coefficient, b2=yd2 is
coefficient for the determinants of the intensity of capital controls, (i-i
Euro)i,t is the closed nominal interest
rate differential of country i in period t, (i-i
Euro)i,t-1 is the closed nominal interest rate differential of country
i in period t-1, xi,t are the determinants of the intensity of capital controls excluding EXR, ES, LEFT and
SIGGOV of country i in period t, gi is the country-specific effect and ei,t is the error term for country i
27 To our knowledge, only the OECD has comparable data available to examine sectoral financial balances (OECD, Financial
Statistics, Part II, Financial Accounts of OECD countries). See also Mooslechner (1994) and Lemmen and Eijffinger (1995b).
28 Of course, there are more relevant indicators such as the market share of the five largest banks, or the number of bank branches
per 100,000 inhabitants etc. (see e.g. King and Levine, 1993 and Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994). Since data are difficult to obtain,
we leave this for further research.
29 Actually, we should write b3gi, but this term can only be estimated in a composite form. We are not able to disentangle the
constant coefficient b3 and the country-specific effect gi. So, without loss of generality b3 can be normalized at one.14
in period t.
30 The subscript i represents the countries in our sample (i=1,..,N) and subscript t is the time
subscript (t=1,..,T).
Before turning to the estimation results, we will briefly describe the estimation technique for the above
fixed-effects model (see Hsiao 1986, pp. 29-32 and Eijffinger, Van Rooij and Schaling, 1994). For
convenience, we introduce the following notation:
Now, we are able to rewrite equation (10) as
Note that we have comprised the common intercept b0 and the country-specific effect gi together to zi. The
(11)
reason for this is that because both terms are fixed constants we cannot identify or estimate them separately.
Wewill refertoziasthegeneralizedcountry-specific effecttodistinguishitfromthecountry-specificeffect
gi. Ensuing, we need the following notation:
Now equation (11) can be written as
31
DefinematrixQasQ=IT−ee’/TwhereITdenotestheidentitymatrixwithdimensionsTbyT.Premultiplying
(12)
equation (12) with Q has the effect of transforming all observations into deviations of their individual means.
Performing this transformation on equation (12) gives:
30 We assume the error term ei,t to be an independently, identically distributed random variable with mean zero and variance s
2
e.
Furthermore, we assume that the error term is independent of the regressors. Moreover, when we use F- and t-statistics, we implicitly
make the assumption that the error term is normally distributed.
31 The conditions for ei,t imply for ei:
with IT denoting the T by T identity matrix.15
Since transforming a constant into a deviation of its individual mean gives zero, the term zie drops out.
(13)
Applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to (13) gives the following within-group estimator (Hsiao, 1986,
p. 31):
32
(14)
Now we can estimate zi by:
with
(15)
and
The variance-covariance matrix of the within-group estimator is
with
(16)
and
(17)
The parameter k denotes the number of regressors. Basically, the fixed-effects model implies that all countries
have the same coefficients in front of the exogenous variables but that the intercepts are different among
the 11 EU countries. We are referring to the generalized country-specific effects (zi) because we are only
able to estimate these in a composite form. This is no problem because our main interest is not in the exact
value of these effects but their ranking. Furthermore, under proper conditions for the error term we can
32 The estimator is called this way because only the variation within each group (country) is used.16
apply OLS to equation (13) and the within-group estimator is BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator)
(Hsiao, 1986, p. 32).
Next, we turn to the estimation results. The sample consists of 11 EU countries for which data are available:
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The intention was to use publicly available data sources (OECD and IMF) (see Appendix B).
The sample contains 216 observations (231 less 11 due to the lagged dependent variable less 4 due to the
lack of forward exchange rate data for Italy). The results are reported in Table 2.
RegressionsAandBexplainclosedinterestdifferentialsbytheirfundamentaldeterminantsx i,t,notincluding
the lagged dependent variable:
In regression A all determinants except the lagged dependent variable are included. In regression B we
(18)
apply the general-to-specific approach (see Charemza and Deadman, 1992). The specification started with
the inclusion of all determinants except the lagged dependent variable, finally arriving at the significant
regressors only.
33
We attribute remaining differences from closed interest parity to country risk premia imposed by the
international financial communityon particular countries. The generalized country-specific effectgi reflects
the effects of expectations that controls might be tightened or eased in the future, or the effect of controls
not currently binding might become a constraint in the future, or the effect of expectations of new controls.
The generalized country-specific effect may also include the risk as assessed by the market that the policy
will not maintained (peso problems) and country-specific risk that cannot be explained by its fundamental
determinants (news). In addition, these country premia also capture the other determinants which cannot
be included in the right-hand side of the regression because they are time-invariant such as the index of
exchange rate flexibility(EXR), theEijffinger-Schaling indexof centralbank independence(ES), theproxy
for the political leaning of the government (LEFT) and the measure for political instability (SIGGOV).
Because these variables are (more or less) constant over time, the coefficients of these variables cannot
be identified in a panel data approach. Moreover, since both EXR and ES are indirectly measured by the
depreciation of the exchange rate (DEP) and the rate of inflation (INF) respectively, the country-specific
effect is mainly attributed to political risk variables such as LEFT and SIGGOV. Furthermore, possible
other sources of political conflict such as high general government gross debt ratios (DEBT) and current
account imbalances (CA) are already included in the right-hand side of the regression.
The first question, then, is to address whether the signs of the individual coefficients conform to theoretical
expectations (see discussion in section 3). By now, considerable agreement exists across studies (Alesina,
Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1994 and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995) that the realized inflation rate (INF) and related
attributes such as the inflation tax (INF TAX) and seigniorage revenue (SEIGN) account for an important
part of closed nominal interest rate differentials (compare the magnitude of the estimated coefficients in
regression A). Generally, high inflation rates are associated with more capital export restrictions. Realized
depreciations of the exchange rate (DEP) are positively associated with the intensity of capital export controls.
Both INF and DEP encourage capital outflows, so more capital export restrictions are expected to be in
place. Strong evidence is found for the intensity capital controls to depend negatively on the size of general
government deficit (DEF).
33 We apply a joint F-test of zero restrictions on the coefficient of the deleted variables. We omit the insignificant variables.1
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The government debt ratio (DEBT) enters insignificantly positive in the regression. Resulting, higher debt
ratiosare positivelyrelated tocapital importcontrols --contraryto ourprior expectation.Apparently, foreign
investors demand compensation in the form of higher domestic returns to compensate for the increased
probability of loan default. Current account surpluses (CA) are associated with capital import restrictions.
With relatively high domestic credit expansion (CREDIT) more capital export restrictions are in place. Little
evidence was found for justifying an important role of broad money (M2) and the unemployment rate (UN)
in explaining the intensity of capital controls. Monetary policies that accommodate high rates of domestic
creditexpansionshouldleadtolowerdomesticinterestratesrelativetooffshoreinterestratesandanegative
coefficient for M2 arises. However, if such accommodating monetary policies are perceived to eventually
lead to higher future inflation or current account deficits a positive coefficient for M2 arises. The openness
of the economy (OPEN) and the productivity of the business sector (PROD) are effective control variables.
The productivity in the business sector provides an important (significant) indication of the direction of
capital flows and, hence, for the objective of capital controls. Low productivity of the business sector may
be an influential argument for restricting capital exports. Apparently, even with capital export restrictions,
capital find their way to the most productive investment opportunities. The openness of the economy is
positively related to the presence of capital export restrictions. New evidence is found to support the
hypothesis of the increasing relevance of financial market structure for the intensity of capital controls.
Withless-developedfinancialmarkets(M2M1)relativelyhighercapitaloutflowsareexpected.Accordingly,
capital export restrictions are more feasible with low ratios of M2 over M1.
Regression B finds the variables INF, DEF, CA, M2M1, CREDIT and PROD to be the most important
explanations of capital control intensity. Regression B indicates the existence of significant country risk
premia (see country-specific effects zi in Table 2).
34 The countries are listed in ascending order of estimated
country risk premia (zi). Consequently, it may be important to include the lagged dependent variable as
an explanatory variable in the regression.
In regression C we explain closed interest differentials by the persistence in the intensity of capital controls
as measured by coefficient b1 in equation (19).
Coefficient b1 reflects the direct effect of capital controls in place. The country-specific effects capture
(19)
all other determinants of closed interest differentials. The within-group estimator forb1 is 0.548 with standard
error of 0.055 and a coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom (R
2) of 0.33. Again, the
countries are listed in ascending order of estimated country risk premia (zi). This regression may be seen
as the reference point for regressions D and E identifying the fundamental determinants of the financial
integration in the EU.
We now arrive at our principal models of the fundamental determinants of capital controls. The estimation
results of the partial adjustment model in equation (20) are summarized in regressions D and E of Table
2.
In regression D all determinants are included. Regression E is equivalent to D but now only reports the
(20)
most significant variables applying general-to-specific modelling including only the significant variables.
Regressions D and E tests for the relative importance of the persistence in capital controls (i.e. lack of
34 The significance may also be caused by the common constant (b0) to be significantly different from zero.19
financial integration caused by capital controls) vis-à-vis domestic factors in explaining closed interest
differentials. If financial integration is strong (coefficient b1 is small) domestic factors will be a more
importantexplanationforclosedinterestdifferentials.Theregressionsalsoallowforthepresenceofcountry-
specific risk unexplained by the right-hand side of the regression. Including the lagged dependent variable
together with the domestic determinants xi makes it possible to explain a substantial part of the intensity
of capital controls. The generalized country-specific effect in regressions D and E is interpreted slightly
differently thaninregressions AandB. Thedomesticdeterminantsxi affectthemagnitude ofthecoefficient
b1 of the lagged dependent variable. Coefficientb1 arguably captures existing capital controls. If we compare
regression C with regressions D and E, the magnitude of coefficientb1 declines with the country risk premium
that is explained by the other determinants xi in the regression such as the perceived probability of debt
default (DEF) and the risk of loss of purchasing power (INF). The generalized country-specific effect is
assumed to pick up the other political risks. We expect countries with high political risk to show lower
country-specific effectszi and, consequently, a lower generalized country-specific effect. A negative country-
specific effect may indicate that more capital export restrictions are expected. The existence of political
risk (unrelated to the economic fundamentals) puts a limit on the extent to which international investors
are willing to hold a particular asset. The results for Regression D are broadly in line with those of regression
A, B and C.
Regression E advances that closed interest differentials in EU countries have been largely determined by
realized inflation and government deficits together with the persistence in capital controls. So domestic
monetary and fiscal policy are dominant determinants of closed interest differentials. Remaining insignificant
country risk premia (see the country-specific effects of regression E) depend on a small number of
"fundamentals" indicating confidence in the country’s policies.
For ease of comparison, we have ranked the generalized country-specific effects in Table 2. The estimates
for zi recurrently coincide with a priori ranking of EXR, ES, LEFT and SIGGOV in Appendix B. In Table
3 we report formal statistical tests for positive c.q. negative correlations between the generalized country-
specific effects from regressions B and E and the variables EXR, ES, LEFT and SIGGOV.
Table 3 - Test for positive c.q.negative correlation between the generalized country-specific effect
and EXR, ES, LEFT and SIGGOV (absolute t-statistics are indicated between brackets)
a
Sample correlation coefficient of generalized
country-specific effect with:
B E
EXR 0.136 (0.412) -0.227 (0.698)
ES 0.292 (0.916) 0.163 (0.496)
LEFT -0.340 (1.085) 0.104 (0.315)
SIGGOV -0.481 (1.645)
* -0.826 (4.399)
**
a We calculate the following t-statistic for the correlation coefficient r; where n-2 are the degrees of freedom (Dougherty,
1992, p. 112).
* Significantly different from zero at the 95 % level of confidence (one-tailed test).
** Significantly different from zero at the 99 % level of confidence (one-tailed test).
The results for EXR and LEFT are ambiguous. An increase in EXR leads to both an increase in the
generalized country-specific effect (B) and a decline in the generalized country-specific effect (E). An increase
in LEFT leads to a decline in the generalized country-specific effect (B) and a decline in the generalized
country-specific effect. Both EXR and LEFT are insignificantly related to the country-specific effect. This
result of EXR contrasts with that of Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), while the result for LEFT
correspondswithAlesina,GrilliandMilesi-Ferretti(1994).Apparently,otherexplanationsattherighthand-
side of the regression dominate. An increase in ES leads to an increase in the country-specific effect (both
B and E), but again ES is insignificantly related to the generalized country-specific effect. This may be
due to the variable INF which is already included in the right-hand side of the regression equation. Finally,20
an increase in SIGGOV leads to a significant decline of the generalized country-specific effect (B and E).
So, we agree with the prediction of Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) that capital export controls
are more likely imposed in countries with less independent central banks and in countries with significant
government changes.
The generalized county-specific effects in regression E indicate that Belgium and Italy have potentially
greater risks for investors as follows from the negative country risk premia with respect to regression E.
Judging the negative sign of the generalized country-specific effect, capital export restrictions are more
likely. Nevertheless, the political risks are insignificant. From regression B it follows that also Finland and
Sweden probably have very low generalized country-specific effects. Investments in Finland and Sweden
apparently involve relatively high (but insignificant) political risks.
Finally, we should mention some critical measurement issues. First, the relationship between the intensity
of capital controls and its explanatory variables is often subject to uncertainty. The finding of no significant
association with the intensity of capital controls may simply reflect the crudeness of the measured dependent
and independent variables. Second, controls on capital outflows may also reduce capital inflows, as foreign
investors worry about their ability to transfer income outside the country. Or a country imposes both capital
import as well as capital export restrictions. These aspects of capital controls are difficult to grasp. Third,
multicollinearityproblemsmayexistinregressionsAandD.Forexample,theinflationvariableisofcourse
closely related to the seigniorage revenue and the inflation tax variable. The same may hold for the inflation
rate and the expansion of broad money. Therefore, regressions B and E apply general-to-specific modelling
to find the main (significant) determinants. Lastly, future research may want to consider covered interest
parity for long-term bonds (calculated with the help of currency swaps) as it is unclear if the results go
through in financial assets with maturities of say more than 1 year.
5 Conclusions
The process of financial integration has received considerable attention in recent years. The paper has provided
renewed evidence on the fundamental determinants of the intensity of capital controls. Using closed interest
differentials to measure the intensity ofcapital controls and applying a panel data approach,we have identified
the fundamental determinants of the intensity of capital controls in the EU. The main empirical results can
be summarized as follows. The most important implication of increased financial integration is that it forces
a greater degree of interest rate parity across countries, and that it reduces the scope for independent monetary
(the interest rate instrument) and fiscal policy in the EU. Although, we emphasize different factors contributing
to deviations from closed interest rate parity, broad common ground exist for the intensity of capital export
controls to depend positively on realized inflation (INF) and government deficits (DEF) (see regressions
B and D). Particularly, this adverse effect of inconsistent national monetary and fiscal policies has been
of crucial importance in explaining the intensity of capital controls after allowing for the persistence in
capital control intensity (see regression E). Furthermore, regarding almost all other arguments considered
inthis study,the basicpurpose ofcontrols oncapital flowshas beento providea certaindegreeof autonomy
from external economic circumstances. We find credit to the domestic economy (CREDIT) to be significantly
positively correlated with the intensity of capital export restrictions (see regression B). Furthermore, also
low productivity in the business sector (PROD) and low availability of sophisticated deposit instruments
(M2M1) belong to the main determinants of the intensity of capital export restrictions (see regression B).
These explanatory variables were not taken into account by previous studies. Similar to Alesina, Grilli and
Milesi-Ferretti (1994), we find capital export restrictions to be less likely in countries with current account
surpluses (CA) (see regression B).
Remaining differentials from closed interest parity are the consequence of country risk premia imposed21
by the international financial community on particular countries. The paper finds relatively high but
insignificant political risks in Belgium, Finland, Italy and Sweden (see regression E). This is in contrast
with Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) who find significant political risks for a sample of 20 OECD
countries. These insignificant political risks are basically attributed to political instability approximated
by significant government changes. This is in accordance with Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994)
who find that capital export controls are more likely imposed in countries with significant government
changes.
In contrast with previous research, this paper highlights the impact of (differences in) national economic
and financial structures on financial integration. With capital controls increasingly being eliminated, we
expect the underlying characteristics of economic and especially financial market structure to be major
determinantsofremainingclosednominalinterestratedifferentialsinthefuture.Monetaryandfiscalpolicy
in the EU are expected to become increasingly dependent on varying economic and financial structures,
rather than on financial integration.22
Appendix A
Dummy variable of separate restrictions on payments for capital transactions: if these restrictions are in place, the variable takes the value
of 1, and 0 otherwise.
CONTROL 1 AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1973 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
1974 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
1975 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
1976 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
1977 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
1978 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 8
1979 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 8
1980 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1981 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1982 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1983 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1984 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
1985 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
1986 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
1987 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1988 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1989 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1990 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1991 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1992 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 4
1993 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 5
TOTAL 19 0 16 20 21 0 18 6 21 21 7
Source: International Monetary Fund, Exchange Restrictions, 1973-1978 and International Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions, Annual Reports, 1979-1993.
Dummy variable of separate exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions and/or some or all invisibles: if these restrictions are
in place, the variable takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise.
CONTROL 2 AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1973 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 5
1974 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 5
1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
1976 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
1977 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
1978 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
1979 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
1980 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
1981 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
1982 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
1983 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1984 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1986 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1987 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1988 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1989 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 18 0 0 2 0 10 2 0 0 6
Source: International Monetary Fund, Exchange Restrictions, 1973-1978 and International Monetary Fund, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange
Restrictions, Annual Reports, 1979-1993.23
Index of restrictions on payments for capital transactions and separate exchange rate(s)for some or all capital transactions and/or some
or all invisibles: If both restrictions are in place, the index takes the value 2, if one restriction is in place the index takes the value of 1,
and 0 otherwise.
CONTROL 3 AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1973 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 14
1974 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 14
1975 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 12
1976 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 12
1977 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 12
1978 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 11
1979 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 10
1980 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 9
1981 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 9
1982 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 9
1983 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 8
1984 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7
1985 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7
1986 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7
1987 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 8
1988 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 8
1989 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1990 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1991 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1992 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 4
1993 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 5
TOTAL 19 18 16 20 23 0 28 8 21 21 13
Source: authors’ own calculation.
Intensity of capital controls = 0.12 − 0.06 Control 1 R
2 = 0.23
(0.50) (0.03)
Intensity of capital controls = −0.71 − 0.008 Control 2 R
2 = -0.11
(0.37) (0.06)
Intensity of capital controls = 0.67 − 0.08
* Control 3 R
2 = 0.36
(0.59) (0.03)24
Appendix B
The dependent variable
Variable Countries
Germany, France, Netherlands,
United Kingdom.
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, Italy, Spain, Sweden.
Representative three-month domestic money-market interest rates
Finding consistent comparable interest rate data for the EU countries under consideration is far from easy. To the extent possible, given
data availability over long sample periods, we tried to use publicly available representative three-month money-market interest rates
(monthly series). The integration of one segment of the money-market, that is taking one asset among many, may give a misleading
impression of the overall short-term mobility of capital. This problem may partly be overcome by the use of representative short-term
interest rates. Quoting the OECD (1990b, p. 45): "[...] the aim has not necessarily been to take the same rate for all countries, but to
choose the rates which are the most typical or the most revealing, or again, those which may be described as the reference' rates. In
drawing up the following norms, while attention has, of course, been given to ensuring as much international comparability as possible, it
has nevertheless been necessary to have regard for the fact that the methods of calculation used by countries to some extent reflect the
institutional features of their financial markets."
Country Period Description Source
Austria January 1973-December 1993 3-month vibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
Belgium January 1973-December 1993 3-month treasury bills OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
Denmark January 1973-December 1975
January 1976-December 1993
Central bank deposit certificates
3-month interbank rate
OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
OECD, Main Economic Indicators
Finland January 1973-April 1987
May 1987-December 1993
Average cost of central bank financing
3-month helibor
OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
France January 1973-December 1993 3-month pibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
Germany January 1973-December 1993 3-month fibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
Italy January 1973-December 1993 3-month treasury bills OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
Netherlands January 1973-December 1985 3-month loans to local authorities OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
January 1986-December 1993 3-month aibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
Spain January 1973-December 1976
January 1977-December 1993
Rates charged: Short-term credits up to
3 months
3-month interbank loans
OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
Sweden January 1973-December 1981
January 1982-December 1993
3-month treasury bills
3-month discount notes
OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
United Kingdom January 1973-December 1993 3-month interbank rate OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I
Representative three-month Euro money-market interest rates
Representative three-month Euro money-market interest rates are available for the following EU countries: Germany, France, Netherlands
and the United Kingdom (monthly series).
Source: OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Part I.25
Three-month forward exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM
The following are our own cross-rate calculations of forward exchange rates of EU currencies vis-à-vis the DM based upon end-of-period three-
month forward exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar (monthly series). The forward exchange rates are expressed as premiums (+) and
discounts (−) on the forward value of the currency relative to its spot price. Defining the spot rate as currency units per US dollar, the
formula for the forward premium on the currency in percent per annum is:
The annualized forward premium or discount is based on a 360-day year, and the three-month forward rate is the rate for 90 days, yielding
the factor 4 that is employed in the formula. Since direct DM forward (and spot) exchange rates are not available for all EU countries
considered and/or over a sufficiently long period, we used cross-rate calculations of forward and spot exchange rates of EU currencies vis-à-
vis the DM based upon forward exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. Concerning these cross-rate calculations, we already presume in the
investigation design perfect capital mobility. However, this is only possible on the basis of the assumption of perfect arbitrage between
markets of foreign exchange. Due to transactions costs in triangular arbitrage, cross-rate calculations do not exactly correspond to direct
quotations. In constructing DM forward and spot exchange rates, dollar cross-rate calculations are preferred because of the reserve currency
status of the dollar, the role of the dollar as the world’s major intervention currency and the scale and efficiency of the US financial
markets. Forward exchange rates for Italy are only available from January 1977 onwards.
Source: IMF (1985), International Financial Statistics Supplement on Exchange Rates and IMF, International Financial Statistics, line 60f.
Spot exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM
Own cross-rate calculations of spot exchange rates of EU countries vis-à-vis the DM based upon end-of-period spot exchange rates vis-à-
vis the US dollar (monthly series).
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, line ae.
The independent variables
Indicator Description Source
CA Current account balance as percentage of GDP OECD, National Accounts, Main Aggregates, Volume I,
1960-1993
CREDIT Total domestic credit to the economy as percentage of GDP IMF, IFS Yearbook 1994, line 32
DEBT General government gross debt as percentage of GDP OECD Economic Outlook
DEP Proxy for three-month exchange rate expectation, Realized
three-month exchange rate depreciation vis-à-vis the DM, Own
cross-rate calculation. Germany, realized three-month exchange
rate depreciation vis-à-vis the US dollar
IMF, International Financial Statistics, line ae
EXR Variable indicating exchange rate flexibility, 2 minimal flexi-
bility, 1 intermediate flexibility and 0 maximal
flexibility
IMF, Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report, 1973-1978.
IMF, Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restric-
tions, Annual Report, 1979-1993
ES Eijffinger-Schaling index of central bank independence (ranges
from 1 minimal independence to 5 maximum independence)
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993), Eijffinger and Van Keu-
len (1995)
DEF General government financial balance (government net lend-
ing) as percentage of GDP
OECD Economic Outlook
GDP Gross domestic product OECD, National Accounts, Main Aggregates, Volume I,
1960-1993
M0 Base money (reserve money) IMF, IFS Yearbook 1994, line 14
M1 Money as percentage of GDP IMF, IFS Yearbook 1994, line 34
M2 Money plus quasi-money as percentage of GDP IMF, IFS Yearbook 1994, lines 34 (Money) and 35
(Quasi-money)
M2M1 Money plus quasi-money over money IMF, IFS Yearbook 1994, lines 34 and 35
INF Rate of change in the consumer price index (1990=100) IMF, International Financial Statistics, line 64
INF TAX Inflation rate times M0 as percentage of GDP IMF, International Financial Statistics, line 64 (CPI),
IMF, International Financial Statistics, line 14 (Reserve
Money)
LEFT Dummy variable, taking the value 1 when a left-wing gov-
ernment is in place and the value 0 otherwise
Banks (1993), Political Handbook of the World: 1993,
CSA Publications, State University of New York, Bing-
hamton, New York
OPEN Openness = (Export of goods and services+Imports of goods
and services)/GDP
OECD, National Accounts, Main Aggregates, Volume I,
1960-1993
PROD Productivity in the business sector, index (1987=100) OECD Economic Outlook
SIGGOV The total number of significant government changes, measure
for political instability
De Haan and Van ’tHag (1994)
SEIGN Growth rate of nominal GDP times base money (M0) as
percentage of GDP
IMF, International Financial Statistics, line 64 (CPI), line
14 (Reserve Money)
UN Unemployment rate OECD Economic Outlook26
Exchange Rate Arrangements: minimal flexibility (2), intermediate flexibility (1) and maximum flexibility (0).
AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1973 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 18
1974 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 14
1975 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 13
1976 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 1 2 0 15
1977 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 13
1978 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 1 1 0 14
1979 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1980 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1981 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1982 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1983 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1984 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1985 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1986 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1987 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1988 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1989 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1990 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 16
1991 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 18
1992 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 18
1993 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 12
TOTAL 22 42 42 21 36 42 28 42 12 25 4
Source: Index constructed with the help of IMF, Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report, 1973-1978 and IMF, Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report, 1979-1993.
Eijffinger-Schaling index of central bank independence
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden United
Kingdom
ES 3 3 4 3 2 5 2 4 1 2 2
Source: Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and Eijffinger and Van Keulen (1995).
De Haan-Van ’tHag index of significant government changes
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Italy Netherlands Spain Sweden United
Kingdom
SIGGOV 2 4 1 3 4 1 6 3 1 2 0
Source: De Haan and Van ’tHag (1994).27
Incumbent government: left-wing government (1), right-wing government (0).
LEFT AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1973 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 7
1974 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 8
1975 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 7
1976 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 7
1977 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 6
1978 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5
1979 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 6
1980 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
1981 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 7
1982 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 8
1983 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1984 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1985 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1986 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1987 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 5
1988 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5
1989 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
1990 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
1991 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
1992 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
1993 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
TOTAL 21 8 10 15 12 10 9 12 12 16 6
Source: Dummy variable constructed with the help of Banks (ed.) (1993), Political Handbook of the World: 1993, CSA Publications, State
University of New York, Binghamton, New York.
Ranking of countries’ EXR, ES, LEFT and SIGGOV variables: a priori assumption, Rank 1: few capital controls - Rank 11: many
capital controls
EXR ES LEFT SIGGOV
1 UK 4 Germany 5 UK 6 UK 1
2 Spain 12 Denmark 4 Belgium 8 Denmark 1
3 Finland 21 Netherlands 4 Italy 9 Germany 1
4 Austria 22 Austria 3 Denmark 10 Spain 1
5 Sweden 25 Belgium 3 Germany 10 Austria 2
6 Italy 28 Finland 3 Netherlands 12 Sweden 2
7 France 36 France 2 Spain 12 Finland 3
8 Belgium 42 Italy 2 France 12 Netherlands 3
9 Denmark 42 Sweden 2 Finland 15 Belgium 4
10 Germany 42 United Kingdom 2 Sweden 16 France 4
11 Netherlands 42 Spain 1 Austria 21 Italy 62
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Appendix D
CC = −1.37 − 0.30
** INF R
2 = 0.53 CC = 0.04 − 0.25
** DEP R
2 = 0.63
(0.65) (0.09) (0.27) (0.06)
CC = −1.02 + 0.004 M2 R
2 = −0.11 CC = −33.51
** + 0.35
** PROD R
2 = 0.52
(1.83) (0.03) (9.51) (0.10)
CC = −0.22 − 0.10 UN R
2 = −0.06 CC = −0.78 − 0.003 DEF R
2= −0.11
(0.86) (0.15) (0.45) (0.10)32
CC = −1.01 + 0.005 DEBT R
2 = −0.10 CC = −0.59 − 0.30 CA R
2 = 0.14
(0.78) (0.01) (0.30) (0.19)
CC = −0.23 − 0.64 INF TAX R
2 = 0.10 CC = −0.24 − 0.48 SEIGN R
2 = 0.07
(0.49) (0.36) (0.49) (0.36)
CC = −1.68
* − 0.01 OPEN R
2 = 0.06 CC = −1.63 + 0.01 CREDIT R
2 = − 0.07
(0.77) (0.01) (1.64) (0.02)
CC = −0.75 − 0.005 M2M1 R
2 = −0.11
(0.93) (0.27)33
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